

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 10-13

TIME
25 June 1979

CIA-01 TURNING Admin.
C-01-01, Jimmy
Brezhnev, 1979
0791

'Khorosho,' Said Brezhnev

That means good, and it marked the tone as he finally met Carter

EXCERPTS

The summit was designed to help clear away misconceptions on both sides. The participants knew, however, that they were going to Vienna somewhat impaired, Brezhnev by his age (72) and ailments; Carter by his loss of political support (the latest polls show him with only 30% approval). Neither leader had any illusions about making major breakthroughs. At a Kremlin dinner before his departure, Brezhnev expressed only the hope that the summit would "become an important stage of further development of Soviet-American relations." As Carter left Washington, he warned that progress toward peace is "often measured in inches and not in miles."

Despite the forecast of modest achievements, Carter went to Vienna visibly excited. He told aides that he had looked forward to meeting Brezhnev more than almost anything else during his years as President, and he spent an unprecedented amount of time preparing for the encounter. He phoned Richard Nixon, who had signed SALT I in Moscow in 1972, for advice on how to deal with Brezhnev. Gerald Ford came by the White House to suggest that if Brezhnev became blustery, as he did at Vladivostok in 1974, Carter should respond politely but firmly and not retreat an inch. CIA Director Stansfield Turner showed Carter some video tapes of Nixon's and Ford's meetings with Brezhnev so that the President could observe the Soviet leader's mannerisms.

* * * *

Last to arrive in Vienna was the summit's centerpiece, the 78-page SALT II treaty. Its remaining details were still being negotiated for most of the week in Geneva by teams of U.S. and Soviet diplomats. The final issue was minor, and the butt of much diplomatic banter. The chief CIA man on the U.S. delegation had presented his KGB counterpart with a T shirt emblazoned: FREE THE TYURATAM EIGHTEEN! The gift was one of those arcane jokes that are best appreciated by SALT technicians. It referred to 18 heavy-missile launchers at the Soviets' Tyuratam test site in central Asia, which the Soviets claim are used only for tests and are not to be used for strategic weapons. Well past the eleventh hour, the Soviets agreed to dismantle twelve of the launchers and to guarantee